rekahsoft
/
guix
1
1
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Wiki Activity

gnu: exiv2: Add upstream security fixes. 

Fixes CVE-2017-14859, CVE-2017-14860, CVE-2017-14862 and CVE-2017-14864.

* gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14859-14862-14864.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14860.patch: New files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Register them.
* gnu/packages/image.scm (exiv2)[source]: Use them.
This commit is contained in:
Marius Bakke 2017-10-26 22:58:28 +02:00
parent ba2cd6c2d8
commit 4119376d66
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: A2A06DF2A33A54FA
4 changed files with 118 additions and 0 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
gnu/local.mk
View File

@ -605,6 +605,8 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/eudev-rules-directory.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/evilwm-lost-focus-bug.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/exim-CVE-2017-1000369.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14860.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14859-14862-14864.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/fastcap-mulGlobal.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/fastcap-mulSetup.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/fasthenry-spAllocate.patch \

2
gnu/packages/image.scm
View File

@ -866,6 +866,8 @@ channels.")
version ".tar.gz")
(string-append "https://fossies.org/linux/misc/exiv2-"
version ".tar.gz")))
(patches (search-patches "exiv2-CVE-2017-14860.patch"
"exiv2-CVE-2017-14859-14862-14864.patch"))
(sha256
(base32
"1yza317qxd8yshvqnay164imm0ks7cvij8y8j86p1gqi1153qpn7"))))

66
gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14859-14862-14864.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
Fix CVE-2017-14859, CVE-2017-14862 and CVE-2017-14864.
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14859
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14862
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14864
Copied from upstream:
https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/commit/8a586c74bbe3fbca64e86e42a42282c73f427607
From 8a586c74bbe3fbca64e86e42a42282c73f427607 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Dan=20=C4=8Cerm=C3=A1k?= <dan.cermak@cgc-instruments.com>
Date: Sat, 7 Oct 2017 23:08:36 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix for CVE-2017-14864, CVE-2017-14862 and CVE-2017-14859
The invalid memory dereference in
Exiv2::getULong()/Exiv2::StringValueBase::read()/Exiv2::DataValue::read()
is caused further up the call-stack, by
v->read(pData, size, byteOrder) in TiffReader::readTiffEntry()
passing an invalid pData pointer (pData points outside of the Tiff
file). pData can be set out of bounds in the (size > 4) branch where
baseOffset() and offset are added to pData_ without checking whether
the result is still in the file. As offset comes from an untrusted
source, an attacker can craft an arbitrarily large offset into the
file.
This commit adds a check into the problematic branch, whether the
result of the addition would be out of bounds of the Tiff
file. Furthermore the whole operation is checked for possible
overflows.
---
src/tiffvisitor.cpp | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/tiffvisitor.cpp b/src/tiffvisitor.cpp
index 4ab733d4..ef13542e 100644
--- a/src/tiffvisitor.cpp
+++ b/src/tiffvisitor.cpp
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ EXIV2_RCSID("@(#) $Id$")
#include <iostream>
#include <iomanip>
#include <cassert>
+#include <limits>
// *****************************************************************************
namespace {
@@ -1517,7 +1518,19 @@ namespace Exiv2 {
size = 0;
}
if (size > 4) {
+ // setting pData to pData_ + baseOffset() + offset can result in pData pointing to invalid memory,
+ // as offset can be arbitrarily large
+ if ((static_cast<uintptr_t>(baseOffset()) > std::numeric_limits<uintptr_t>::max() - static_cast<uintptr_t>(offset))
+ || (static_cast<uintptr_t>(baseOffset() + offset) > std::numeric_limits<uintptr_t>::max() - reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(pData_)))
+ {
+ throw Error(59);
+ }
+ if (pData_ + static_cast<uintptr_t>(baseOffset()) + static_cast<uintptr_t>(offset) > pLast_) {
+ throw Error(58);
+ }
pData = const_cast<byte*>(pData_) + baseOffset() + offset;
+
+ // check for size being invalid
if (size > static_cast<uint32_t>(pLast_ - pData)) {
#ifndef SUPPRESS_WARNINGS
EXV_ERROR << "Upper boundary of data for "

48
gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14860.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
Fix CVE-2017-14860.
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14860
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14860
Copied from upstream:
https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/commit/ff18fec24b119579df26fd2ebb8bb012cde102ce
From ff18fec24b119579df26fd2ebb8bb012cde102ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Dan=20=C4=8Cerm=C3=A1k?= <dan.cermak@cgc-instruments.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Oct 2017 23:09:08 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix for CVE-2017-14860
A heap buffer overflow could occur in memcpy when icc.size_ is larger
than data.size_ - pad, as then memcpy would read out of bounds of data.
This commit adds a sanity check to iccLength (= icc.size_): if it is
larger than data.size_ - pad (i.e. an overflow would be caused) an
exception is thrown.
This fixes #71.
---
src/jp2image.cpp | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/jp2image.cpp b/src/jp2image.cpp
index 747145cf..748d39b5 100644
--- a/src/jp2image.cpp
+++ b/src/jp2image.cpp
@@ -269,10 +269,15 @@ namespace Exiv2
std::cout << "Exiv2::Jp2Image::readMetadata: "
<< "Color data found" << std::endl;
#endif
- long pad = 3 ; // 3 padding bytes 2 0 0
+ const long pad = 3 ; // 3 padding bytes 2 0 0
DataBuf data(subBox.length+8);
io_->read(data.pData_,data.size_);
- long iccLength = getULong(data.pData_+pad, bigEndian);
+ const long iccLength = getULong(data.pData_+pad, bigEndian);
+ // subtracting pad from data.size_ is safe:
+ // size_ is at least 8 and pad = 3
+ if (iccLength > data.size_ - pad) {
+ throw Error(58);
+ }
DataBuf icc(iccLength);
::memcpy(icc.pData_,data.pData_+pad,icc.size_);
#ifdef DEBUG