b7178dc45d
Actually, CVE-2015-0801 and CVE-2015-0816 were already patched in
4c153a9125, but the corresponding CVEs
were not yet announced.
* gnu/packages/patches/icecat-bug-1146339.patch: Rename to ...
* gnu/packages/patches/icecat-CVE-2015-0801.patch: ... this.
* gnu/packages/patches/icecat-bug-1144991.patch: Rename to ...
* gnu/packages/patches/icecat-CVE-2015-0816.patch: ... this.
* gnu/packages/patches/icecat-CVE-2015-0807.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/icecat-CVE-2015-0815-pt1.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/icecat-CVE-2015-0815-pt2.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/icecat-CVE-2015-0815-pt3.patch: New files.
* gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Add them, and adapt to renamed files.
* gnu/packages/gnuzilla.scm (icecat): Add patches, and adapt to renamed files.
77 lines
3.4 KiB
Diff
77 lines
3.4 KiB
Diff
From ae49ed04f54c2f78d6ba7e545e0099602a3270fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Boris Zbarsky <bzbarsky@mit.edu>
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Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 18:58:44 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH] Bug 1144991 - Be a bit more restrictive about when a
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URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE source is allowed to link to a URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE URI that
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doesn't have the same scheme. r=bholley, a=abillings
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---
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caps/src/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
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1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/caps/src/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp b/caps/src/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp
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index 3587358..6577b95 100644
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--- a/caps/src/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp
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+++ b/caps/src/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp
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@@ -770,12 +770,31 @@ nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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if (hasFlags) {
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if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME) {
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+
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+ // For now, don't change behavior for resource:// or moz-icon:// and
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+ // just allow them.
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if (!targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("chrome")) {
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- // for now don't change behavior for resource: or moz-icon:
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return NS_OK;
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}
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- // allow load only if chrome package is whitelisted
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+ // Allow a URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE source to link to a URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE
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+ // target if ALLOW_CHROME is set.
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+ //
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+ // ALLOW_CHROME is a flag that we pass on all loads _except_ docshell
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+ // loads (since docshell loads run the loaded content with its origin
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+ // principal). So we're effectively allowing resource://, chrome://,
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+ // and moz-icon:// source URIs to load resource://, chrome://, and
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+ // moz-icon:// files, so long as they're not loading it as a document.
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+ bool sourceIsUIResource;
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+ rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(sourceBaseURI,
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+ nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE,
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+ &sourceIsUIResource);
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+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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+ if (sourceIsUIResource) {
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+ return NS_OK;
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+ }
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+
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+ // Allow the load only if the chrome package is whitelisted.
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nsCOMPtr<nsIXULChromeRegistry> reg(do_GetService(
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NS_CHROMEREGISTRY_CONTRACTID));
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if (reg) {
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@@ -787,17 +806,14 @@ nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
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}
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}
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- // resource: and chrome: are equivalent, securitywise
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- // That's bogus!! Fix this. But watch out for
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- // the view-source stylesheet?
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- bool sourceIsChrome;
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- rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(sourceBaseURI,
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- nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE,
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- &sourceIsChrome);
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- NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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- if (sourceIsChrome) {
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+ // Special-case the hidden window: it's allowed to load
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+ // URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE no matter what. Bug 1145470 tracks removing this.
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+ nsAutoCString sourceSpec;
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+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(sourceBaseURI->GetSpec(sourceSpec)) &&
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+ sourceSpec.EqualsLiteral("resource://gre-resources/hiddenWindow.html")) {
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return NS_OK;
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}
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+
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if (reportErrors) {
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ReportError(nullptr, errorTag, sourceURI, aTargetURI);
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}
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--
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2.2.1
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